


Murielle Cozette's essay on the consideration of Clausewitz by the French philosopher Raymond Aron is particularly interesting. Aron studied Clausewitz in the context of the World Wars and the Cold War. One key concept, derived from Clausewitz's 'Wondrous Trinity', is the concept of the state as the personalised trustee of the interests of the whole community, this trusteeship serving as a restraint to prevent escalation to extremes. This concept is important, because it emphasises the importance of the government representing the interests of all citizens, not just those who share its ideological predilections. To Aron, the concept that *L'état, c'est moi* (or my party) excludes moderation.

Antulio Echevarria's essay on Clausewitz and the Cold War is of most interest in demonstrating the intellectual gymnastics in which many Cold War philosophers engaged. Herberg-Rothe's concluding essay on Clausewitz and the democratic warrior studies the recent rise of the professional fighter, and the corresponding decline of the army of citizens in uniform. He sees this as enabling a strategy of curbing violence to allow the 'organic development of democratic self-determination', not imposing democracy by force. At best, the jury seems still out on the success of this strategy. Worth reading, despite the difficult style.

Jihadi Terrorism and the Radicalisation Challenge – European and American experiences

Rik Coolsaet (ed.)
Ashgate: Farnham UK, 2011
ISBN: 978-1-4094-2569-4

Reviewed by Dr Nyagudi Musandu, Kenya



This book is essential for officials involved in identifying and profiling the scope and nature of any jihadi terror threat. It is a compendium of academic research and the experience of hands-on counter-terrorism experts, such as Robert Lambert of the UK, with his innovative ideas such as the establishment of Muslim contact units in London—a critical tool for de-radicalisation and deconstruction of jihadi propaganda.

Given that the text was edited and compiled in the light of the 'Arab spring', it has the tested and proven insight that Muslims can affect their political desires in their home countries without resorting to terrorism. A major lesson is that there are key persons whose interdiction renders a terrorist organisation deprived of its knowledge base and active central coordination.

The book also introduces new concepts, such as discussed in 'The Life Cycle of Cell-based Jihadi Terrorism' by Paul Pillar. Another is the likelihood or obligations that may cause national leaders to support jihad, which is explored in Chapter 3, a study relevant to those dealing with the conflict in Afghanistan and its roots in Pakistan. Hugh Roberts also explores this concept, however, his paper fails to properly assess the intent and capabilities of AQIM (Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb), evidenced in its recent take-over of Northern Mali, after a short-lived successful Tuareg uprising against the Government of Mali.

In another paper, Martha Crenshaw discusses the interesting perspective of terrorism being used to propagate the ideals of loyalty to a deity, without empathy for those with opposing views. But the paper may not be right on the overthrow of Saddam Hussein's regime in Iraq, as arguably it was his desire and propensity to confront the US, which was almost certainly likely to manifest itself in the form of 'new' terrorism sponsorship and facilitation, if he was left in power. Although the war in Iraq may have inspired many 'new' terrorists, its prosecution—resulting in the demise of the Saddam regime—denied them a ready and willing sponsor. Indeed, the random and 'microscopic' nature of many of the 'new' terrorist groups generated by the war in Iraq makes them a more varied—but substantially less serious—threat to the US and its allies than the continuance of the Saddam regime.

Lenna Malki's paper that is Chapter 6 offers some insights of the group dynamics that were inherent in the far-left terror organisations operating in Europe in the 1960s, 70s and 80s, which are still applicable when analysing the functions and operations of present-day jihadi groups.

The paper on 'Terrorism Studies', by Teun Van de Voorde, elaborates on the uncertain efforts of academics in developing a unified/grand theory of terrorism. It also explains the pros and cons of qualitative and quantitative analysis as applicable to the study of terrorism. On the qualitative side of this spectrum, he argues that a cause of terrorism is assumed to be either positive or negative in terms of the education of individuals to the extent they cannot accept the negation of their social, political and economic norms by a more dominant government system. This compels such individuals to register their opposition to government by random acts of violence.

In Marc Sageman's paper, it is evident that his dialectics are heavily dependent on empirical evidence. Interestingly, from the reviewer's own analysis and past readings of radical groups in Kenya, Sageman's description of the formation of radical groups tallies with observations of the formation of many such groups in Kenya.

In another, Oliver Roy maps out the amorphous functions and network of international jihadi terrorism. He explains how global jihadi terrorists create and exploit local social networks via local mentors. He cites elements of local networking including marriage and crime, while international networking is facilitated by financial support arrangements, social relationships developed by travelling jihadi terrorists and the Internet.

Rik Coolsaet has several papers in this volume. The most interesting is his research on 'Revolutionary Terrorism', in which he puts forward the argument that today's problems of terrorism are nothing new, contending that 'Anarchism' in Europe, with its roots in the 19th century, is comparable to today's jihadi-type terrorism threat. His conclusion is that all governments must be prepared for the challenge of 'revolutionary' terrorism, given that most states create inefficiencies that result in the radicalisation of certain of its people.


In Jocelyne Cesari's contribution, there is the proposition that many jihadi terrorists today are persons who lack true cultural connection to their families, and that quite a number are new converts or those who have recently rediscovered their religion. In the opinion of the reviewer, this is an observation that can also apply in modern-day Kenya, where the police have recently arrested a number of such persons.

Many of the research papers in this book are empirical studies, backed by considerable research data. One of the key features is how to establish and run a de-radicalisation unit, which is a missing link in many counter-terrorism operations. More broadly, an enduring conclusion is that it is difficult to specify the terrorism threat. Terrorists are from diverse backgrounds, and terrorism comes from a multitude of threats, persons, groups and motives, which cannot easily be profiled.

The August Offensive at Anzac, 1915

David W. Cameron
Big Sky Publishing: Newport NSW, 2011
ISBN: 978-0-9870-5747-1

Reviewed by John Donovan



The Australian Army's Campaign Series version of David Cameron's 2009 book on the August battles (published by University of NSW Press as *Sorry Lads, But The Order Is To Go: the August offensive, Gallipoli, 1915*) provides a readable, well-illustrated account of those dramatic events. While Cameron does not offer any startling new revelations, he does provide a very readable account.

After reading this book, one is left with a clear understanding that the battle was doomed to failure from its inception, whatever the heroic efforts of the combatants. As Cameron demonstrates, it was simply too much to ask tired men (many of whom had been almost constantly in the front lines for over three months) to march long distances—at night, across terrain of almost indescribable complexity, with no worthwhile maps—and then expel their enemies from dominating terrain.

The difficulties of coordinating the actions of widely-separated forces were insuperable in an era where a telephone was a sophisticated form of communication (if its wires had not been severed by gunfire or passing traffic), while runners had little chance of finding their way to their destination, and less of finding their way back to where they had started. Those difficulties ensured that any attempt to react to events on the battlefield would be delayed to the point of irrelevance. They were exacerbated by command failures.

Cameron is (rightly) critical of Godley's performance during these battles. Godley did not take control but allowed Johnston, commanding the New Zealand infantry brigade, to control some follow-up attacks involving more than his own brigade. However, Johnston seems, at best, to have been suffering from stress during the battle, refusing to move during darkness but ordering daylight attacks later. On one occasion, he rejected proposals for the provision of machine-gun support for an attack, virtually threatening his brigade machine-gun officer with disciplinary action for persisting with an offer to 'cover your advance and put troops up there without casualty'.

GUIDANCE FOR AUTHORS

The *Australian Defence Force Journal* seeks articles on a wide range of defence and security matters, such as strategic studies, security and international relations. Normally, articles will only be considered for publication if they are current and have not been published elsewhere. In addition, the *Journal* does not pay for articles but a \$500 prize is awarded by the Board of Management for the article judged to be the best in each issue.

The Layout

Articles need to be submitted electronically and typed in MS Word format without the use of templates or paragraph numbers (essay style). Headings throughout are acceptable (and contributors should view previous issues for style). Length should ideally not exceed 4000 words, including endnotes. Please 'spell check' the document with Australian English before sending. Additional guidelines are available from the website.

Articles should contain endnotes, bibliography (preferably as 'additional reading', to supplement rather than replicate endnotes) and brief biographical details of the author.

Endnotes

- for articles are required in the style: Edward D. Mansfield, 'The concentration of capabilities and the onset of war', *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 36, No. 1, 1992, pp. 3–24.
- for monographs are required in the style: Edward D. Mansfield, *The Concentration of Capabilities*, Allen & Unwin: Sydney, 1998.

References or bibliography

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Tables, maps and photographs are acceptable but must be of high enough quality to reproduce in high resolution. Photographs must be at least 300 ppi in TIF format and obviously pertinent to the article.

The Review Process

Once an article is submitted, it is reviewed by an independent referee with some knowledge of the subject. Comments from the reviewer are passed via the Editor to the author. Once updated, the article is presented to the Australian Defence Force Journal Board of Management and, if accepted, will be published in the next *Journal*. Be advised, it may take quite a while from submission to print.

Authors with suitable articles are invited to contact the Editor via email at:
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Authors accept the Editor may make minor editorial adjustments without reference back to the author, however, the theme or intent of the article will not be changed.

